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The Key to Dreams:
The Law and the Other City
Andrde Viana Garc6s* & Juan Felipe Pinilla Pineda**
This other city is the spontaneous city, the refuge of those
excluded from the chance of a formal life, it is the precari-
ous city filled with dreams rather than life ..
I. INTRODUCTION
2
Bogota, like other cities, has problems in providing housing
for the lower paid sector. Approximately 20% of families are living
in substandard housing' (housing deficit),4 15% of families are
without housing (quantitative deficit),6 and approximately 5% live
in poor quality housing7 (qualitative deficit).' Further, approxi-
mately 122 persons migrate to the city each day. Fleeing from vio-
* Researcher at the Institute of Comparative Public Law at the Universidad
Carlos III de Madrid.
** Professor of Property and Real Estate at the Universidad de los Andes Law
School in Bogoti, Colombia. Consultant in urban planning and housing.
1. Fabio H. Avendafio Trivifio & Hernando Carvajalino Bayona, Vivienda
Popular Espontdnea: Conceptos de Espacialidad y Progresividad. Reflexiones a Partir
de un Estudio de Caso: Bogotd, Colombia, in CHrDAD Y TERRITORIO ESTUDIOS
TERRITORIALES 391, 394 (2003).
2. Our title is taken from the famous 1930's painting Key to Dreams by Ren6
Magritte.
3. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, http://www.dane.
gov.co/index.php?option=com content&task=category&sectionid=34&id=573&Itemid
=1080 (last visited May 28, 2009) [hereinafter DANE].
4. Housing deficit refers to families living in private housing with living
conditions which result in both quantitative and qualitative deficits and who
therefore require rehousing, improvement, or an extension to their current living
quarters. See DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA, CENSO
GENERAL 2005: FICHA METODOLOGICA DPFICIT DE VIENDA 2 (2005), http://www.dane.
gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/censofFMdeficitvivienda.pdf [hereinafter FicHA
METODOLOGICA].
5. DANE, supra note 3.
6. Quantitative deficit is an estimation of the amount of homes which society
needs to build or add to create a one-to-one ratio between adequate homes and
families needing accommodation; that is, it is based on a comparison between the
number of families needing housing and the number of appropriate homes in
existence. See FIcHA METODOL6GICA, supra note 4, at 2.
7. DANE, supra note 3.
8. Qualitative deficit refers to private homes with substandard living conditions
in respect of structure, space and availability of public services and therefore they
require improvement or extension of the family homes in which they live. See FicHA
METODOLOGICA, supra note 4, at 3.
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lence, they are forced to leave their original homes, therefore
causing this deficit to grow at a constant and vertiginous rate.
Adding to these displaced persons are those who are continuously
pushed out toward the periphery by the urban economy, swelling
the numbers of the structurally poor.9 These are the excluded,
those condemned by a city to which they have become invisible,
because the law governing Bogotd has closed all doors to them.
These builders and inhabitants have become members of the
Other City, one which has grown and become established beyond
the boundaries of the official law.
Obviously, there are many neighborhoods that arise from
these survival dynamics, and they speak volumes to the real exis-
tence of the welfare state and the universality of human rights.
They also reveal much about city access and the ineptitude of
urban planning and law in ensuring the social and territorial
cohesion of a city which, like Bogota, is suffering an enormous and
ongoing explosion of its population. Therefore, as we are con-
vinced that the law can only be interpreted through the society
experiencing it, and that any analysis of that law must be made
from a realistic perspective, we propose to use the story of the
Bogotd neighborhood of Jerusal6n as symptomatic of how the law
is suffering from the disease of ineptitude.
II. JERUSALtN: A DREAM, THE PROMISED LAND
A. History of the Neighbourhood
The Jerusal~n neighborhood grew in the midst of Ciudad Bolf-
var, a large scale government housing project funded by the Inter-
american Development Bank (IDB). Over the previous two years,
various buildings were completed in Jerusal~n, providing housing
for over a thousand families. However, operational problems and
an unsatisfactory public services infrastructure rendered them
uninhabitable.1
According to one of the neighborhood's leading figures, part of
the motivation behind the project was to seek a profitable return
on some privately owned land close to the district authorities,"
which was not entirely appropriate for urban development. Adja-
9. See Avendafto Trivifio & Carvajalino Bayona, supra note 1, at 393.
10. See MARIA MERCEDES MALDONADO, EL SIGNIFICADO JURiDICO DEL "DERECHO A
LA CIUDAD" 2 (2002) (report given at Lincoln Institute for Land Policy, Curso de
Desarrollo Profesional, Mercados Informales: Regularizaci6n de la Tenencia de Tierra
y Programas de Mejoramiento Urbano en Amdrica Latina, Nov. 18-22, 2002).
11. See id.
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cent to these plots was the Hacienda Casa Blanca (Hacienda),
which today has become Bogotd's Jerusal~n neighborhood. It is
characterized by its arid, mountainous terrain, ideal for quarry-
ing, but hardly apt for an urban settlement. Those plots of land
which were not sold to the authorities were, according to the afore-
mentioned community leader, informally developed so as to make
some use of them. The land was never occupied by violence.
In the early 1980s the land was inhabited only by the Haci-
enda's custodians. Influenced by a group of real estate developers,
they began a procedure of adverse possession or squatter's rights
to obtain ownership of the land, and the company Sociedad
Urbanizadora del Sur was incorporated. The partners,2 as the
neighborhood settlers referred to them, became pirate developers"3
of the Hacienda. They divided the land into plots of 7 x 14 M 2 , and
by 198214 rumor was rife among the most vulnerable of the city's
population that in Hacienda Casa Blanca plots were practically
being given away. 5 Prices varied, depending on the topographical
conditions of the terrain; however, they were undoubtedly much
more accessible solutions than those offered under formal market
conditions. In effect, sales of some plots were made at allegedly
low prices (allegedly since the lack of infrastructure made the
prices comparatively higher than those for rural land) and others
were put on sale for similar prices, or were handed over in
exchange for movable property.
6
The sales of the plots were not made according to the legal
formalities required for the sale of real estate, due, among other
reasons, to the fact that vendors were not the formal proprietors of
12. The partners were engineers, lawyers, property developers, police officers,
pirate planners, all covered by a network of intermediaries. See id. at 4.
13. This is the name traditionally given to these city agents in Bogot. Their
activities are characterized by selling plots which do not have the requisite
infrastructure (public services, roads, parks and facilities) for low income families. In
general, sales are made without any legal formalities for transfer of the real estate.
Thus, the agents promise plots for sale which are not habitable as they have not been
properly included in urban planning. Accordingly, it is paradoxical that they are
called developers when it is precisely what they never do, i.e., urban development of
the land.
14. The 1980s were characterized by the continuation of a policy of permissive
tolerance of informal processes in terms of housing in Latin America. See Julian
Salas Serrano, Pertinencia y Urgencia del Mejoramiento Barrial en Latinoam~rica, in
CiuDAD Y TERRITORIO EsTUios TERRITORIALEs 73-88, 143 (2005).
15. See MALDONADO, supra note 10.
16. See generally Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Pluralismo Juridico y Propiedad
Extralegal: Clase, Cultura y Derecho en Bogotd, 36 REVISTA DERECHO PRIVADO 207
(2006).
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the land. Thus, to close the sale of the plots, promissory sale agree-
ments were signed once the price of the property had been pur-
chased with money or other goods. These promissory agreements
were fully valid documents among the neighborhood community
and served as proof of purchase of a plot. In support of the valid-
ity of these documents, the community organized a property regis-
tration system, which established the location of each plot and
recorded its legitimate occupant in order to maintain control over
the ownership of each plot and avoid any disputes arising from
selling the same portion of land over and over to various people.
Although the first problem faced by the residents was a dis-
proportionate police presence and harassment, it was a series of
different challenges that ultimately led them to organize as a
group, such as the tremendous community effort required to gain
access to essential public services. The residents grouped together
to arrange the provision of water and to supervise the improvised
infrastructure they had installed (hosepipes and tanks), or to pro-
vide pack animals to bring gallons of drinking water to the area
until the water supply company built a proper tank. When the
settlement was granted legal status, main drinking water and
sewage networks were set up. The electricity supply was estab-
lished in a similar manner. The neighborhood became established
thanks to a tenacious and exemplary community, to the obser-
vance of the internal legal system that spontaneously arose dur-
ing the process, and due to the success-albeit partial-in
insisting that the State provide public services to homes.
Although the story of how this neighborhood was structured
and established is considered exemplary in terms of the power of
community effort and the strength of the alternative legal system
which sprang up during the process, this is also true of other cases
of spontaneous construction of neighborhoods in Bogotd. The coin-
cidence lies specifically in the following aspects: the concentration
of a marginalized population in informal settlements, their means
of access to the land and to housing, the subhuman conditions of
the initial dwellings, uncertainty regarding the official recognition
of the district, the precarious nature of urban facilities, and the
difficulties of access to the city.
B. The Path Towards Formality: A Dream Thwarted
by the Law
The Jerusal~n neighborhood, like other districts of Bogota,
arose and developed on the margins of the legal plans for the city's
328
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formal growth and also outside the legal framework for obtaining
and attesting to ownership of property. This may have been the
key to the settlers' dream: namely, to remain outside the margins
of an official law that was unable to respond to their primary
needs. Later, however, when their Other City was physically con-
solidated, they intended to take the steps towards entering the
great city via the portals of a law which would finally be required
to heed them. However, the reality is rather different, and the
story of Jerusal6n and its path to legal recognition (still incom-
plete) has made it quite clear that the law has closed its doors to
dreamers.
The extent of the phenomenon of informal urban development
in Colombia has led, in recent decades, to the creation of various
legal and urban planning mechanisms that have attempted to
remedy this situation and offer alternative ways of acting and
intervening. On one hand, the local authorities have been author-
ized to officially recognize-a process known as urban legaliza-
tion-the neighborhoods and districts that have sprung up on the
margins of the formal urban growth in cities. Similarly, legal con-
ditions and special administrative and judicial procedures have
been put in place to facilitate the security of tenure of this type of
housing and formalization of their deeds of title.
This part of the study of the Jerusal6n case aims to demon-
strate the failure of the offered solutions to have any relevance to
the typical legal problems presented by the existence of informal
settlements and the mechanisms that these settlements have
themselves devised and implemented to address and resolve these
difficulties. In order to do so, we propose to tell the story, step by
step, of the neighborhood's legal peregrinations on its path to
becoming a formal part of Bogota.
Following its establishment, Jerusal6n's first urban recogni-
tion came in 198911 through a procedure of urban legalization
resulting from the provisions of an agreement of the City Coun-
cil-Agreement 1 of 1986-decreeing the legal status of over 250
neighborhoods of a similar origin. That regulation contained a
legal recourse that was to be repeated in subsequent provisions,
namely the creation of a window of time for conversion from infor-
mal to legal. A date is determined by which time the neighbor-
hood should have become established and consolidated in order for
17. See generally Resoluci6n No. 489 of 1989 of Bogotd Administrative
Department of District Planning, Por la cual se Reglamenta el Desarrollo Incompleto
Denominado: JERUSALEN, El Registro Distrital No. 584, Nov. 10, 1989 (Colom.).
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it to be recognized as such. In effect, it was agreed that the neigh-
borhoods established prior to entry into force of this agreement
would be officially recognized; that is, neighborhoods established
prior to February 12, 1986.18
The purpose of the act of recognition or urban legalization-
Resolucion 489 of 1989-was to "officially recognize the existence
and order the incorporation of the Jerusal6n development in the
official plans of the special district of BogotA."1s Further, this act
determined the structure of public and private areas of the neigh-
borhood based on the existing reality, adopted an urban plan that
would define and create the boundaries of public and private
areas, and established that "areas for public use indicated in the
approved plans shall always be used for that specific purpose."2
In addition, the act was concerned with the general state of the
precarious existing infrastructure in terms of energy provisions,
water supply and sewage. Accordingly, it set up the bodies
responsible for their improvement and defined architectural regu-
lations for private plots resulting from the legalization process.
Finally, the act indicated that the resolution "does not cover any
right to tenure of land, the only effects this has on public law or
urban legal nature of the area is in the improvement of public and
communal services and regulations on the physical planning of
the sector." 1
Only on the basis of this recognition was Jerusal~n incorpo-
rated as a definite part of the city in the official zoning of BogotA.
As a result, its inhabitants were able to legalize the buildings con-
structed in the neighborhood. Thus, the procedure for legalizing
these buildings could only be initiated following urban legaliza-
tion that recognized the existence of the neighborhood, thus mak-
ing state law applicable to what goes on in its territory. This
means that urban legalization of the settlement does not assume
legalization of private buildings, nor does it resolve the problem of
the precarious nature of the tenure of the homes built. Conse-
18. The reference to a cut-off date has been one of the constants in this type of
regulation. The intention is not to encourage spontaneous construction of
neighborhoods. However, the reiterated use of this regulation has led some to
maintain that these measures provide a stimulus to the phenomenon of spontaneous
settlements. We consider in any case that these regulations do not generate a call
effect which does not promote the creation of irregular settlements, but simply
responds to a social reality which to date has not been assumed by more general and
serious housing policies. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at art. 9, para. 2.
21. Id. at art. 30.
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quently, the neighborhood has been included in Bogota's official
plans, while its inhabitants and constructions continue to remain
on the margins of the city and formal law fails to offer them any
guarantees with respect to their right to a home.
In short, the urban legalization procedure is almost exclu-
sively a response to the need to legally protect public investments
required in neighborhood improvement programs, such as paving
roads, installing permanent water and sewage networks, and the
provision of public facilities. Until a neighborhood is officially rec-
ognized, public investment is not legally possible, as this would
require investing public money in what are formally private
assets. Nevertheless, the act of legalization does nothing to
resolve the ownership of assets destined for public use.
The situation following urban legalization is as follows: on
one hand state law accepts the existence of the neighborhood plots
of land; however, conversely, it continues to turn a blind eye to the
buildings constructed on them as a result of the progressive hous-
ing developments. Further, the act of legalization declares the
public use of those neighborhood areas that are to be used by the
community and in which the State will intervene as lender and
guarantor of public services (public services and supplies to
homes, social services, education, recreation, health, etc.). Sur-
prisingly, the district did not acquire those plots, so although they
are destined for public use, they continue to be privately owned
assets. This results in a decidedly schizophrenic system. In effect,
the procedure for legalizing the Jerusal~n neighborhood is an
example of the incomplete, inconsistent, and precarious nature of
the formulas available for addressing the problems common to
spontaneous popular housing settlements.
With respect to the problem of the precarious nature of tenure
of the homes, as indicated in Resolucion 489 of 19892 and other
national regulations that have regulated this issue, legalization
does not assume any pronouncement on the rights of occupants to
the built-on lots. As a result, the Resolucion is not a definitive
guarantee of the security of families' tenure of their homes. Given
that the pirate developers could not transfer ownership to the
occupants, with the result that the occupants are merely posses-
sors who will only be able to acquire firm tenure of the property
through the passage of time by means of adverse possession or
22. Resoluci6n No. 489 of 1989 of Bogotat Administrative Department of District
Planning, Por la cual se Reglamenta el Desarrollo Incompleto Denominado:
JERUSALEN, El Registro Distrital No. 584, Nov. 10, 1989 (Colom.).
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squatter's rights.23
Given this state of affairs, the problem of unstable tenure is
reduced to one of irregularity of the ownership of the occupants
and the solution needs to be found by means of specific proce-
dures. In order to consolidate ownership of the homes, special
terms have been created for adverse possession,24 administrative
procedures,25 and facilities for pursuing the judicial procedure
leading to declaration of ownership 26 or special processes when the
neighborhoods were located on land belonging to local authorities
or to the State.27
All these options and solutions are exclusively designed to
ensure the security of tenure of the homes through individual pri-
vate ownership, leaving aside other possible alternative solutions
by means of alternative systems of land and building tenure.2s On
this point, Colombian law is found to be at its least innovative as
it continues to insist on individual private property as the only
23. Pursuant to the Colombian Civil Code, adverse possession is an original
means of acquiring ownership or property of things which occur or are consolidated
over the passage of time, provided that there are deeds of ownership for the possessor.
For the property's ownership to be remedied, a title deed is required as a prerequisite
for registration of the property. Therefore, the acquisition needs to be declared before
a judge or a notary. These procedures result in legal instruments, a court judgment,
or a notarial deed, which provide ownership of the goods that are the object of the
proceedings. CoD. Crv. arts. 2527-34 (Colom.).
24. Law 9 of 1989 determined a reduction in the terms of adverse possession for
socially subsidized housing. The extraordinary prescription changed from twenty to
five years and the ordinary from ten to three years. See Law No. 9 of 1989, Reforma
Urbana, Diario Oficial No. 38650, Jan. 11, 1989, at 1 (Colom.).
25. Law 1183 of 2008 established the possibility of carrying out a special
administrative procedure before a notary for the declaration of ownership of
subsidized social housing. Prior to this law the only alternative to formalize the
property was a process of declaration of ownership head before an ordinary judge. See
Law No. 1183 of 2008, Por Medio de la cual se Asignan unas Funciones a los Notarios,
Diario Oficial No. 46871, Jan. 14, 1989, at 1 (Colom.).
26. Law 9 of 1989 permitted court claims for declaration of ownership solutions for
social subsidized housing in which claimants could lodge the claim against an
indeterminate person should they be unaware of the name of the registered proprietor
or where the property registry provides no clues on the land or proprietor. See Law
No. 9 of 1989, Reforma Urbana, Diario Oficial No. 38650, Jan. 11, 1989, at 1 (Colom.).
27. Although it was not typical to informal development in Bogota, in some other
districts of the country this phenomenon occurred mainly on plots of publicly owned
land. For this type of situation, Law 9 of 1989 established the possibility that such
land was the object of free assignment to the families which had occupied them. See
id.
28. It is interesting to cite the figure of the collective acquisition through
prescription established in Article 10 of the Brazilian Cities Statute. It consists of the
possibility that all occupants in a settlement may claim property of the overall land in
the settlement, with each family being a proprietor of a portion of the overall terrain.
See Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.07.2001, at art.10 (Brazil).
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option or means of ensuring the regularization and security of
tenure.
With regard to public areas, legalization is not sufficient for
an effective declaration of public property on precarious and insuf-
ficient areas that the community has designated for roads, neigh-
borhood facilities, or green spaces. Despite the fact that these
areas of terrain are allocated for public use, it is equally true that
they formally remain the private property of their original own-
ers.29 Occupants of the plots designated for homes may adversely
possess property over which the owners have effectively lost con-
trol and possession. This is not the case with public areas. It is not
legally possible for the community to gain ownership through
adverse possession, which would effectively include using and
enjoying the asset, because the City as an institution would ulti-
mately retain public ownership. As a result, such areas frequently
remain in a kind of limbo where they are regarded as private
property that has been officially designated for communal use.
In the case of Jerusal6n this situation is particularly dra-
matic. The discussion on the ownership of areas designed for com-
munal use and the formulas for their effective transfer to the
public domain has had a marked effect on this main contention.
In fact, four years after the act of legalization to which we referred
earlier, the legalization was contested by the heirs of the former
owners of the Hacienda Casa Blanca. The owners, ignorant of the
principals of property law, challenged the legalization-in partic-
ular the communal use of "public spaces"-on the ground that
their due process rights were infringed when they were not
included in the process of urban legalization. The lower court
delivered a judgment in favor of the heirs. In 2000 the Consejo de
Estado overturned the lower court and held the judgment
invalid."
29. "Through the legalisation processes these plots were destined for public use
without this meaning that they had become public property. That is, although these
plots were subject to administrative wishes to designate them for public use for the
common benefit of the inhabitants, and effectively they are used by the population as
zones of public use, and although this use enables them to frame them within the
definition of public space as defined in Article 5 of Law 9 of 1989, it is also true,
however, that the ownership of this property is not headed by legal entities of a public
nature but still remains in the private domain. :. . Ultimately, this means that the
expansion of pirate urban developments generated a considerable number of
properties designated for public use which nevertheless remained in the private
domain." MINISTERIO DE AMBIENTE, VIVIENDA Y DESARROLLO TERRITORIAL, GUA
METODOLOGICA: MECANISMOS DE RECUPERACION DEL ESPACIO POBLICO 29 (2005).
30. Case No. 5070, Nov. 9, 2000, [Council of State, First Section] (Colom.).
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Despite the fact that in this case the claimants were seeking
financial compensation, the Consejo de Estado awarded nonmone-
tary damages. The court ordered the city authorities to initiate
new legalization proceedings in which all of the interested parties
to the claim could be involved from the outset. As a result, the
legalization procedure had to be repeated and culminated in the
issue of a new legalization act in October 2002.31 Between Novem-
ber 2000, when the Consejo de Estado rendered its judgment, and
the new legalization act's entry into force in April 2003, the neigh-
borhood once more ceased to exist as far as official plans and pub-
lic investment in infrastructure were concerned. Work still
pending as part of the rehabilitation procedure was suspended.
In order to resolve the situation and to be in compliance with
the provisions of the Consejo de Estado's judgment, the District
Planning Administration Department in Bogotd (DAPD) in
Bogotd initiated a new procedure involving the heirs. However,
the legalization act was not the cause preventing them from
enjoying and making use of their land; the permissive attitude of
the owners for over ten years could be interpreted as conduct
which tolerated this adverse occupation.
This new legalization act became final on April 7, 2003. In a
decision dismissing the appeal, the Mayor of Bogotd refused to
give the proprietors compensation, reasoning that the act of legali-
zation had not been detrimental to them since, with or without the
act of legalization, they had already lost their use and enjoyment
of the property as a result of the continuous possession by the
community of squatters since 1989.32
The judgments upholding the new legalization process were
also contested by the proprietors. Although the case has not yet
become final in first instance, the corresponding Court considered
that the right to private property had been infringed upon and
decided that the proprietors should be awarded the right to main-
tain legal title to their property. The mechanism for accomplish-
ing this consisted of the city government-either through direct
negotiation or via expropriation-acquiring those sectors of the
neighborhood indicated in the act of legalization as public prop-
erty, and "following the legalization order consequentially pass to
31. See generally Resoluci6n No. 0349 of 2002 of Bogotd Administrative
Department of District Planning, Por la cual se Legaliza el Desarrollo Jerusal6n,
perteneciente a la Localidad No. 19 de Ciudad Bolivar, Oct. 1, 2002 (Colom.).
32. After which appeals were lodged against Resoluci6n 0394, concluding in the
dismissal of the appeal by the city's mayor.
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the administration of the Capital District which would make the
property right of those who had acquired it under law ineffec-
tual."" To date, the conflict still remains unresolved. The city has
not defined any specific solution and the neighborhood continues
to remain hostage to a schizophrenic legal system. There are areas
for public use that are privately owned, and plots and houses that
are recognized in Bogotd's official plans with uncertain tenure,
inhabited by absent citizens marginalized and without any legal
rights to their dwellings.
To summarize, the regulations that have historically defined
the conditions of the urban legalization process continue to hold
that the act of legalization makes no pronouncement on the prop-
erty rights in conflict. To restrict the scope of urban legalization
to a mere formality does nothing to contribute to clarifying or
resolving the ownership problem. Tenure of homes and access to
the city is hardly commensurate with the significance of a declara-
tion of this nature.
It is true that the recognition and weight given to urban legis-
lation is an administrative declaration with considerable symbolic
efficacy. 4 On one hand it enables the investment of public funds,
and on the other it accepts the existence of the neighborhood or
sector, incorporating it in the official maps of the city. On the offi-
cial map of the city it shows an urban section with areas dedicated
to communal use, as well as plots of land for private use with a
high degree of established homes. This sends an eloquent mes-
sage and a successful one for the community which has fought
tirelessly, not only to build its houses, but to make the step from
informal to formal housing rights; that is, to gain the attention of
the local authorities by formally becoming a part of the city. It is
in this respect that its symbolic scope is belied by the precarious-
ness of its legal effects in conflicts regarding ownership of the land
and effective access to the city.
Given this state of affairs, and more than 25 years after the
initial occupation of this sector, Jerusal6n's official recognition as
part of the city continues to remain hanging in the balance.
Despite the fact that homes have already been established, that
the majority of the streets are paved, that urban facilities exist
and that some occupants now have individual property deeds, the
official existence of the neighborhood as part of the city has still
33. Case No. 5070, Nov. 9, 2000, [Council of State, First Section] (Colom.).
34. See generally MAuRlcio GARcfA VILLEGAS, LA EFICACIA SIMB6LICA DEL
DERECHO: EXAAMN DE SITUACIONES COLOMBIANAS (1993).
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not been resolved. Therefore there remains a deep-seated aliena-
tion of the city's inhabitants who continue to be denied citizenship
status and instead are treated as an underclass. They are con-
demned within and by a city that cannot integrate them, because
the law governing the city has consistently closed its doors to
them. In this way social divisions are perpetuated, and urban
planning law continues to be distanced from what should be one of
its prime objectives, namely, to ensure territorial consistency and
cohesion in order to guarantee peaceful coexistence by manage-
ment of an urban center which consults and practices social
justice.
III. GAPS IN THE LAW AND THE OTHER CITY
Although the case of Jerusal~n is paradigmatic from a per-
spective of legal pluralism and the organization of community self
management, it is also true that, above all, it serves as an exam-
ple of the territorial fracturing of the city and social exclusion
caused by segregation.3"
Segregation, which is apparent from the history and situation
of Jerusal6n, is the result of two cracks or gaps in the law which
destroy the underwritten logic of the welfare state at two different
moments; one prior to the establishment of the spontaneous set-
tlement, and the other at a later date. The first crack appears as
the direct cause of the existence of irregular settlements. The sec-
ond arises with the impossibility of integrating those settlements
into the formal city. The first of these failures is due to the
absence of an urban planning policy which includes in its objec-
tives the promotion and guarantee of the right to housing and pro-
tection of other constitutional rights, such as equal opportunities
in the labour market, access to education, health and children's
recreation. The second failure lies in the ineptitude evident in the
legal formulas for urban legalization employed to convert the
inhabitants of a "legalized" neighborhood into citizens.
35. Similarly to Juli Ponce Sold, we consider segregation as the action and/or
result of the separation of the population within the city, according to criteria
responding to the social and economic, ethnic or racial characteristics or any other
features, which generally coincide with characteristics which could be deemed
discriminatory. See Juli Ponce Sold, Profesor Titular de Derecho Administrativo,
Universidad de Barcelona, La legalidad urbanistica tendente a hacer efectivos
diversos derechos constitucionales y, en especial, el derecho a la vivienda. ZUna
"nueva ciencia del derecho urbanistico" mds alld de la protecci6n del derecho de
propiedad y del desarrollo econ6mico?, Talk Presented at the III Congreso de
Asociaci6n Espafiola de Profesores de Derecho Administrativo (Feb. 8, 2008).
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These two legal failures have a common cause: the bare
notion of a right to housing derived from a partial understanding
of the constitutional text.3 6 The Corte Constitucional, in Article 93
of the Constituci6n Politica de Colombia, has referred to interna-
tional human rights treaties ratified by Colombia, in particular
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the interpretations made of this treaty by its authorized body,
the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights. 7 In General Comment 4, the Committee explained the
scope of each of the elements that make up the right to adequate
housing.38 The Court has made use of this general comment on
numerous occasions in order to establish the constitutional con-
tent of the law, unreservedly adopting39 all the components which
the Committee itself articulated.
Nevertheless, this is where the gap exists and where the
resulting vacuum then spreads to the rest of the legal system.
The Corte Constitucional, in its task of determining the constitu-
tional content of the right to housing, has left it bare in that in
pursuit of its objective, it has completely ignored the components
that provide most guarantees of legal security of tenure and place.
In effect, not one of the judgments in which the Corte Constitu-
cional addresses the legal problems on the right to housing has
emphasized that security of tenure should also be guaranteed to
"informal settlements, including occupation of land or property."'
Nor has it made use of the fact that the element place assumes the
location of housing in an urban medium in order to be able to exer-
cise other constitutional rights, an element which in the most
advanced European doctrine has been identified with the right to
the city.41
36. CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE COLOMBIA art. 51 (1991) (recognizing the right to
appropriate housing).
37. Corte Constitucional [CC], Sentencia [S.] No. C-936/03, demanda de
inconstitucionalidad, 15 Oct. 2003 (Colom.); Corte Constitucional [CC], Sentencia [S.]
No. T-1318/05, acci6n de tutela instaurada, 14 Dec. 2005 (Colom.); Corte
Constitucional [CC], Sentencia [S.] No. T-403/06, acci6n de tutela instaurada, 25 May
2006 (Colom.); Corte Constitucional [CC], Sentencia [S.] No. T-585/06, acci6n de
tutela instaurada, 27 July 2006 (Colom.).
38. U.N. Com. on Econ. Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCRI, General Comment No.
4 on the right to adequate housing, 17, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991)
[hereinafter CESCRI.
39. See CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA arts. 93-94 (1991).
40. CESCR, supra note 38, at % 8(a).
41. Defined in the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the
City as "a collective space which belongs to all those who live in it, who have the right
to find there the conditions for their political, social and ecological fulfilment, at the
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Thus, returning to the cracks in the law, the absence of an
urban planning policy which includes in its objectives the promo-
tion and guarantee of the right to housing and protection of other
constitutional rights, would probably be resolved more easily if we
were able to rely on developed case law expressly concerned with
the inclusion of an adequate urban medium or habitat in the right
to housing. In effect, some clarity on this component of housing
would be an assumption of express recognition of the link between
the city and housing. This would permit the inclusion of this right
and the State's obligations to protect this right within the mecha-
nisms of urban law, with the final consequence decreasing the
importance of the market as a "natural" regulator of the real
estate sector. This would be a case of urban management that, in
accordance with the traditional economics-based view of the right
to housing, would aim to reduce the quantitative deficit of hous-
ing,42 but that would also, in its role as regulator of the city as a
system, ensure social mixing by adequately locating the protected
housing and the public facilities. The objective is to ensure that all
those have the right to an adequate urban medium, in order to
implement their other constitutional rights, which would permit
territorial consistency and avoid exclusion processes or social
break up.43
We assume that an urban planning system that incorporates
such characteristics would exclude practices that generated urban
segregation and discrimination in the use of land. This includes,
for example, "the segregated location of specific facilities, segre-
gated location of subsidised housing or the absence or insuffi-
ciency of housing in respect of the existing needs."" Even if it
were only partial, while always observing the principle of
non-regressivity,45 urban management such as that proposed
would enable consistent policies providing guarantees of the right
to housing to be implemented in accordance with equally distrib-
uted charges, in terms of the territorial location of the city's inhab-
same time assuming duties of solidarity." European Charter for the Safeguarding of
Human Rights, art. 1, 1 1, May 18, 2000.
42. Which, obviously, does not assume providing every family with ownership of a
home, as some have attempted to allege (in order to detract from validity of the right
and make it seem merely absurd). See CENTRE ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EvIcTIONS,
COMMON MYTHS ABoUT HOUSING RIGHTS 4 (2006), http://www.cohre.org/view-page.
php?page id=86.
43. Ponce Sold, supra note 35.
44. Id. at 1 (translated by author).
45. To which urban planning policies would be subject, provided that they are
related to any element of the right to housing.
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itants. This peaceful coexistence would be ensured if the
guarantee of the constitutional content of the right to housing
were to become the main, prioritized strategy of urban planning.
We say partial, because we do not believe that an immediate,
absolute, stable solution is feasible for a city that receives a daily
influx of immigrants 46 and is thus in constant need of emergency
housing. It would not be sensible to maintain that the city's man-
agement and provision of housing through various forms of tenure
would be sufficient in the short and medium term to overcome the
problems of territorial and social cohesion in Bogota. Thus, even
in the event that urban planning were to make the turnaround we
propose, there would still be a considerable period of time during
which we would continue to see how the city would grow in a spon-
taneous manner as informal settlements spring up, geographically
segregated, in which the most vulnerable members of our society
seek refuge (namely, the homeless and those displaced by vio-
lence). Therefore it is imperative to repair the second chink in the
law mentioned above: the ineptitude of available legal formulas
for urban legalization in enabling residents of a legalized neigh-
borhood to become citizens. These residents must be integrated in
the system of guarantees and rights enjoyed by the majority, as
persons officially recognized and protected under formal law.
This problem could also be resolved by express recognition of
the specific elements of the right to housing mentioned above.
Obviously, the State's obligation to ensure legal security of tenure,
even in irregular settlements, is clear from the text of the Com-
mittee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights General Comment
4.47 The manner in which it repeatedly goes unheeded by legal
professionals and judges is astonishing. Jerusal6n is a prime
example of how the legalization process fails to address the vital
problem of security of tenure in the neighborhood's housing.
A formula that takes the rights of the inhabitants of
Jerusal~n seriously would need to include a response to the preca-
rious situation of the owners. Rather than leaving them to their
own devices and obliging them to undergo protracted legal pro-
ceedings involving adverse possession on the lands that they had
acquired in good faith, and on which they had provided their own
46. According to the Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento
[CODHES], in 2007 44,791 displaced persons arrived in BogotA fleeing violence. That
is, approximately 122 daily or 5 every hour. See CODHES, Departamentos de
Llegada, httpJ/www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com docman&task=catview&gid=
55&Itemid=51 (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
47. See generally CESCR, supra note 38.
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housing, the State should have offered accessible housing to those
on the margins of the labor market, the city's new poor, and those
fleeing from violence who were displaced from their original
homes.
Providing solutions to the problem of the precarious nature of
their tenure would need to be assumed within legalization mecha-
nisms. This is so not only because the State has an obligation
deriving from the right to housing to ensure security of tenure, but
also because the principle of administrative efficacy implies
resolving state-governed matters with as little bureaucracy as
possible and with minimum investment of resources. This princi-
ple does not address the problem of the public services to which
the neighborhood settlers are entitled. Instead it is left to the
courts or other administrative procedures-at considerable cost to
the State-to resolve individually and separately the other rights
of access to public services and facilities.
However, in addition the authorities and legislation are posi-
tively linked by the force of constitutional rights, so that there is
no margin of discretion for determining that the right to security
of tenure is NOT protected. In this same sense it is important to
emphasize that the combination of the right to housing and the
principle of material equality requires the State to design positive
action to remove the obstacles preventing the segregated popula-
tion from accessing the most effective resources in order to ensure
the tenure of their homes.
Furthermore, as we saw in the case of Jerusal~n, the acts of
urban legalization do not resolve the problem of public areas.
These acts fail to comply with the State duty to ensure that homes
are established in an adequate urban medium, the basic elements
of which are the existence of a public area that permits social
engagement, the right to freedom of movement, the right to access
adequate public services, and children's right to recreation, to
name just a few. The case of Jerusaldn is also paradigmatic on
this point, as it shows that the formula for making some spaces
available for public use, while continuing to maintain them as pri-
vate property, generates a legal instability on communal use
which characterizes this land.
In effect, if the land destined for public use continues to be
private property, the sole remaining vestige of this tenure that is
reserved by the owners is the option to petition courts as legiti-
mate interested parties. This assumes that those proprietors sui
generis possess a type of power of impediment in respect of the
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communal use, as has been proved time after time in the case
under study here. Given these circumstances, the public authori-
ties have clearly abandoned their duty to ensure the element of
place in the right to housing. There do not appear to be any rea-
sons that the authority could sustain to the contrary. The physi-
cal and legal instability of public areas prevents the right to
housing to be fully implemented. Of course it implies denial of the
right to the city . . . including the right to a marginalized city,
which is indeed a miserable state of affairs.
Finally, the mechanisms for urban legalization do not take
into account the relation between the right to housing and the con-
stitutional principle of solidarity which, in terms of territory, is
manifested in the principle of territorial cohesion. That is, an
expression of solidarity at a geographic level presupposes a degree
of balance between various areas of a territory.4" In effect, as may
be seen from the manner in which Jerusal~n was dealt with, the
legal instruments established for formalizing the city status do
not include any device for remedying the territorial and social
breach caused by the geographical segregation of the neighbor-
hood and the concentration of poverty and instability among its
inhabitants.
In this context, the right to housing and its element of place is
again extremely relevant, because a city location means a more or
less balanced assumption of drawbacks and benefits. Due to the
geographic and social segregation of Jerusal~n, its inhabitants are
subject to disadvantages which are disproportionate compared to
the benefits of their situation. From a perspective of territorial
distributive justice, the remedies available for compensating or
correcting the disproportionate disadvantages suffered by segre-
gated urban communities, should attempt to bring about changes
in the situation which would ensure that the perspectives of those
more underprivileged inhabitants were as advantageous as possi-
ble.49 In other words, the instruments of public law for redistrib-
uting wealth should make use of compensation as a means of
remedying the shortcomings caused by the urban territorial frac-
ture and the social marginalization which accompanies that
segregation.
48. Juli Ponce Sold, Pr6logo to PADRAIc KENNA, Los DERECHOS A LA VIVIENDA Y
LOS DERECHOS HuMANos 22 (2006).
49. See generally DAVID HARVEY, URBANISMO Y DESIGUALDAD SOCIAL (1977); JuLi
PONCE SOLE, DERECHO URBANISTICO, VIVIENDA Y COHESI6N SOCIAL Y TERRITORIAL
(2006).
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For members of a legalized popular neighborhood such as
Jerusal~n, gaining physical access to the services offered by the
formal city that is located far from the neighborhood is likely to be
beyond their financial capabilities. Due to the costs and time
involved in travelling, the policy makers could at least evaluate
the pros and cons of a stop gap solution which basically would
resemble the results which-without any prior planning-are
being achieved in some neighborhoods of Bogotd. We refer to the
option of being "segregated but equal," which is a rather dubious
model for territorial consistency. This implies renouncing any
attempts at social cohesion and attempting to cover the needs of
the population within each area of the city. This strategy would
sacrifice any social contact between different types of people, yet it
would encourage an urban scenario which would offer its inhabi-
tants sufficient resources to enable them to face life with fewer
disadvantages in respect of the more privileged inhabitants of the
city. A model with these characteristics would presuppose that
both the higher income residents, as well as the most disadvan-
taged, would have access to a good education, health centers in an
adequate state, properly equipped both materially and profession-
ally, public areas in optimum conditions, and well stocked librar-
ies each in their sector of the city, thus compromising the idea of
the city as we know it today."
In defense of the "segregated but equal" model it could be said
that although it means less personal interaction and a lesser
degree of coexistence and social relations in public areas (which
although this transfers some effects of segregation to schools and
probably leads to accentuating a "fear of the unknown"), it would
appear to be a possible means of fulfilling the State duty to ensure
peaceful coexistence. Additionally, it would go some way to
approaching the constitutional value of social justice in a city
environment. If at least this one option were considered in the
process of urban legalization, there would no doubt still be other
criticisms to make of the system. The fact is that the legal formu-
las for official recognition of informal neighborhoods simply do not
consider any measure-neither that of promoting a social mix nor
a segregationist model-for remedying the prejudicial distribution
of disadvantages in the processes of occupying territory in the city.
In fact, the existing legal forms appear to be designed for land
devoid of people, and thus places where no conflicts of rights exist.
50. For a more detailed analysis of the risks of any urban segregation see Ponce
So1M, supra note 35.
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The total disengagement of urban legalization with the social
reality of the regularized settlements shifts the blame onto and
abandons those suffering the privations of so-called social misfor-
tune, which conversely should be compensated as a logical conse-
quence of the valid Welfare State. The constitutional principle of
solidarity, and more specifically, the right to equality, does not
claim to ensure an identical situation at arrival points, but rather
requires the state to ensure equal opportunities for all. 1 As a
result, legalization mechanisms would need to include positive
actions,52 and invest in supplementary resources to overcome the
particular difficulties of the physical and social medium.
Seen from this perspective, the case history of Jerusal~n is a
visible indication of a malaise affecting the relations of the law
and the city, of the deficiency of law (at least Colombian law) in its
requirement to guarantee social cohesion in urban areas. Or, to
put it another way, the legal formulas proposed by the Colombian
system for addressing the problem of social exclusion resulting
from the city's growth are inadequate.
IV. THE LESSON OF JERUSALetN
Jerusal6n is a reflection of problems that are rooted in the
welfare state of law. In general, any informal settlement of popu-
lar housing is a kind of metastasis of the "ineptitude of the State
to procure that which is constitutionally promised but politically
unprotected, i.e., the right to housing and a decent life for all.
53
There are three main causes of this ineptitude, namely the almost
exclusive attention paid to protection and development of private
property, the lack of connection between urban planning, organi-
zation of land and housing, and the incomplete and skewed per-
ception of the right to housing, in which quantitative aspects are
deemed to be paramount.54
The adjustment of urban law to the reality of the city occurs
mainly through connecting the right to housing with the public
duties of land organization. The effective implementation of all
the elements of the right to housing ensures territorial cohesion
51. See generally GERALD PISARELLO, Los DERECHOS SOCIALES Y sus GARANTAS:
ELEMENTOS PARA UNA RECONSTRUCCION (2007).
52. On affirmative action in urban development law see PONCE SOLP, supra note
49 (quoting Thomas Kirszbaum, La Discrimination Positive Territoriale: de L'egalitd
des Chances a la Mixte Urbaine, 111 Pouvoms 101 (2004)).
53. Avendafio Trivifto & Carvajalino Bayona, supra note 1, at 391-420.
54. PONCE SOLA, supra note 49, at 26 (the author identifies these three elements
as structural problems of Spanish urban development law.).
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of the city, avoiding urban models of exclusion and social
disintegration.
The disassociation of the solutions proposed by urban law and
the right to housing generates the problems described in this
work. Of special concern is the ineptitude of the urban legaliza-
tion mechanisms for resolving problems of the inequality and
disadvantage of segregated settlements, because this would per-
petuate urban disintegration insofar as territorial cohesion, as in
any other manifestation of the principle of solidarity may only be
given in a context of equality.5
The present reality of Jerusal6n is unfortunately a mark of
the failure of the mechanisms of urban legalization as instru-
ments for overcoming disadvantages and therefore as devices for
the entry of informal cities into the formal city, which is seen as a
social and territorially consistent system.
V. THE DATA SPEAKS FOR ITSELF
In 2001, Jerusal6n had approximately 75,000 inhabitants,
approximately 70,600 of whom live in stratum one and around
4,400 in stratum two.56 The neighborhood has approximately
15,800 homes. 7 Therefore, it has a high population density, with
approximately 100 homes per hectare. This neighborhood, like all
spontaneous settlements, has a concentration of population with
very poor resources, and many inhabitants experience critical
levels of poverty.5" The majority obtain their income from an
informal economic system, and a scant 7% work in the formal sec-
tor or in small family businesses, workshops and business prem-
ises in the neighborhood, located in living units for mixed use
generating one or two temporary jobs paid as piecework. 9 Studies
by the Alcaldfa Mayor (City Council) of Bogota have found that
due to lack of funds for studying, and the stigmatization suffered
by young people seen as delinquents and drug addicts, the inhabi-
tants are unable to join the formal labor market, thus increasing
the spiral of exclusion and misery.
55. See Gabriel Real Ferrer, La Solidaridad en el Derecho Administrativo, 161
REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACION POBLICA 123, 161 (2003).
56. ALCALDIA MAYOR DE BOGOTA: CAJA DE VMENDA POPULAR, PROYECTO DE
MEJORAMIENTO INTEGRAL DE BARRIOs - PROYECTO SUR CON BOGOTA sec. 5.2.4 (2004).
57. Id. at sec. 5.2.4.2.
58. Id. at sec. 5.2.4.3. Over 50% of its inhabitants earn less than the minimum
salary, and only 10% earn between one and two minimum salaries, amounts which, in
any case, are not sufficient to subsist,
59. Id.
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Thus the lesson of Jerusal~n is clearly a desperate one: the
neighborhood of Jerusal~n is an example of vitality, solidarity,
resistance and otherness. Yet it is also a snapshot of the social
dysfunction prevalent in Bogotd, and a key illustration of the mis-
ery of an urban planning law which, disassociated as it is from the
right to housing, merely serves as a guardian of differences and a
protector of privilege. The dreams of the other city, as key to
social justice, make no impression on the Law. Jerusal~n is a liv-
ing graffiti on the walls of a fractured city: the law knows nothing
of dreams.
